1 2 3 4 Gould 1965, tr. 223–228Lỗi harv: nhiều mục tiêu (2×): CITEREFGould1965 (trợ giúp), "The assumption of spatial and temporal invariance of natural laws is by no means unique to geology since it amounts to a warrant for inductive inference which, as Bacon showed nearly four hundred years ago, is the basic mode of reasoning in empirical science. Without assuming this spatial and temporal invariance, we have no basis for extrapolating from the known to the unknown and, therefore, no way of reaching general conclusions from a finite number of observations."
↑ Gordon, 2013: 82; "The uniformitarian principle assumes that the behavior of nature is regular and indicative of an objective causal structure in which presently operative causes may be projected into the past to explain the historical development of the physical world and projected into the future for the purposes of prediction and control. In short, it involves the process of inferring past causes from presently observable effects under the assumption that the fundamental causal regularities of the world have not changed over time."
↑ Strahler, A.N. 1987. Science and Earth History- The Evolution/Creation Controversy, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York, USA. p. 194: "Under the updated statement of a useful principle of uniformitarianism it boils down essentially to affirmation of the validity of universal scientific laws through time and space, coupled with a rejection of supernatural causes." p. 62: "In cosmology, the study of the structure and evolution of the universe, it is assumed that the laws of physics are similar throughout the entire universe."
↑ Rosenberg, Alex. Philosophy of science: A contemporary introduction, 4th ed. Routledge, 2019, 173
1 2 3 Simpson 1963, tr. 24–48Lỗi harv: không có mục tiêu: CITEREFSimpson1963 (trợ giúp), "Uniformity is an unprovable postulate justified, or indeed required, on two grounds. First, nothing in our incomplete but extensive knowledge of history disagrees with it. Second, only with this postulate is a rational interpretation of history possible, and we are justified in seeking—as scientists we must seek—such a rational interpretation."
↑ FARIA, Felipe. Actualismo,Catastrofismo y Uniformitarismo. In: Pérez, María Luisa Bacarlett & Caponi, Gustavo. Pensar la vida: Filosofía, naturaleza y evolución. Toluca: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, p. 55-80, 2015.
↑ Pidwirny & Scott 1999Lỗi harv: không có mục tiêu: CITEREFPidwirnyScott1999 (trợ giúp), "the idea that Earth was shaped by a series of sudden, short-lived, violent events."
↑ James, Hutton (1785). Theory of the Earth. CreateSpace Independent Publishing.
↑ Hutton, J. (1785). “Abstract, The System of the Earth, Its Duration and Stability”. Bản gốc lưu trữ ngày 7 tháng 9 năm 2008. As it is not in human record, but in natural history, that we are to look for the means of ascertaining what has already been, it is here proposed to examine the appearances of the earth, in order to be informed of operations which have been transacted in time past. It is thus that, from principles of natural philosophy, we may arrive at some knowledge of order and system in the economy of this globe, and may form a rational opinion with regard to the course of nature, or to events which are in time to happen.Quản lý CS1: ref=harv (liên kết)
↑ Robert Macfarlane (ngày 13 tháng 9 năm 2003). “Glimpses into the abyss of time”. The Spectator. Review of Repcheck's The Man Who Found Time. Bản gốc lưu trữ ngày 1 tháng 11 năm 2007. Hutton possessed an instinctive ability to reverse physical processes – to read landscapes backwards, as it were. Fingering the white quartz which seamed the grey granite boulders in a Scottish glen, for instance, he understood the confrontation that had once occurred between the two types of rock, and he perceived how, under fantastic pressure, the molten quartz had forced its way into the weaknesses in the mother granite. Không cho phép mã đánh dấu trong: |publisher= (trợ giúp)
↑ “Jedburgh: Hutton's Unconformity”. Jedburgh online. Bản gốc lưu trữ ngày 29 tháng 7 năm 2009. Whilst visiting Allar's Mill on the Jed Water, Hutton was delighted to see horizontal bands of red sandstone lying 'unconformably' on top of near vertical and folded bands of rock.
↑ Keith Stewart Thomson (May–June 2001). “Vestiges of James Hutton”. American Scientist. 89 (3): 212. doi:10.1511/2001.3.212. Bản gốc lưu trữ ngày 11 tháng 6 năm 2011. It is ironic that Hutton, the man whose prose style is usually dismissed as unreadable, should have coined one of the most memorable, and indeed lyrical, sentences in all science: "(in geology) we find no vestige of a beginning,—no prospect of an end". In those simple words, Hutton framed a concept that no one had previously contemplated, that the rocks making up the earth today have not, after all, been here since Creation.
↑ Wilson, Leonard G. "Charles Lyell" Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Ed. Charles Coulston Gillispie. Vol. VIII. Pennsylvania, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973
↑ Huggett, Richard (1990). Catastophism: Systems of Earth History. London: Edward Arnold. tr. 34.Quản lý CS1: ref=harv (liên kết)
↑ Huggett, Richard (1990). Catastophism: Systems of Earth History. London: Edward Arnold. tr. 33.Quản lý CS1: ref=harv (liên kết)
↑ Huggett, Richard (1990). Catastophism: Systems of Earth History. London: Edward Arnold. tr. 35.Quản lý CS1: ref=harv (liên kết)
1 2 3 4 Gould 1987, tr. 119Lỗi harv: không có mục tiêu: CITEREFGould1987 (trợ giúp), "Making inferences about the past is wrapped up in the difference between studying the observable and the unobservable. In the observable, erroneous beliefs can be proven wrong and be inductively corrected by other observations. This is Popper's principle of falsifiability. However, past processes are not observable by their very nature. Therefore, 'the invariance of nature's laws must be assumed to come to conclusions about the past."
↑ Hutton 1795, tr. 297Lỗi harv: không có mục tiêu: CITEREFHutton1795 (trợ giúp), "If the stone, for example, which fell today, were to rise again tomorrow, there would be an end of natural philosophy [i.e., science], our principles would fail, and we would no longer investigate the rules of nature from our observations."
↑ Gould 1984, tr. 11Lỗi harv: không có mục tiêu: CITEREFGould1984 (trợ giúp), "As such, it is another a priori methodological assumption shared by most scientists and not a statement about the empirical world."
↑ Gould 1987, tr. 120Lỗi harv: không có mục tiêu: CITEREFGould1987 (trợ giúp),"We should try to explain the past by causes now in operation without inventing extra, fancy, or unknown causes, however plausible in logic, if available processes suffice."
↑ Hooykaas 1963, tr. 38Lỗi harv: không có mục tiêu: CITEREFHooykaas1963 (trợ giúp), ="Strict uniformitarianism may often be a guarantee against pseudo-scientific phantasies and loose conjectures, but it makes one easily forget that the principle of uniformity is not a law, not a rule established after comparison of facts, but a methodological principle, preceding the observation of facts... It is the logical principle of parsimony of causes and of economy of scientific notions. By explaining past changes by analogy with present phenomena, a limit is set to conjecture, for there is only one way in which two things are equal, but there are an infinity of ways in which they could be supposed different."
↑ Lemon, R. R. 1990. Principles of stratigraphy. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Publishing Company. p. 30
↑ Gould, Stephen J (1987). Time _s Arrow, Time _s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. tr. 120–121.
↑ William J. Whewell, Principles of Geology, Charles Leyell, vol. II, London, 1832: Quart. Rev., v. 47, p. 103-123.
↑ Allen, E. A., et al., 1986, Cataclysms on the Columbia, Timber Press, Portland, OR. ISBN978-0-88192-067-3
"Bretz knew that the very idea of catastrophic flooding would threaten and anger the geological community. And here's why: among geologists in the 1920s, catastrophic explanations for geological events (other than volcanos or earthquakes) were considered wrong minded to the point of heresy." p. 42.
"Consider, then, what Bretz was up against. The very word 'Catastrophism' was heinous in the ears of geologists.... It was a step backwards, a betrayal of all that geological science had fought to gain. It was heresy of the worst order." p. 44
"It was inevitable that sooner or later the geological community would rise up and attempt to defeat Bretz's 'outrageous hypothesis.'" p 49
"Nearly 50 years had passed since Bretz first proposed the idea of catastorphic flooding, and now in 1971 his arguments had become a standard of geological thinking." p. 71
↑ Ager, Derek V. (1993). The Nature of the Stratigraphical Record (ấn bản 3). Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. tr. 83–84. ISBN0-471-93808-4.
↑ Smith, Gary A; Aurora Pun (2006). How Does Earth Work: Physical geology and the Process of Science (textbook). New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall. tr. 12. ISBN0-13-034129-0.
↑ Ager, Derek V. (1993). The Nature of the Stratigraphical Record (ấn bản 3). Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. tr. 81. ISBN0-471-93808-4.
↑ Gould, Stephen J (1987). Time _s Arrow, Time _s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. tr. 174.
